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Abstract
The issue of software patents is widely discussed in Europe today. The standard economic
rationale for patents is to protect potential innovators from imitation, which ultimately pro-
vides the incentive to incur the costs of innovation. This incentive topic is strongly discussed
in network effect markets such as the software market. We identified five characteristics of
software which are crucial for the question of patenting and its consequences: Sequentiality,
complementarity, the utilization and availability of open code and the necessity to ensure
interoperability as well as the digital character of the goods. Based on seven assumptions
affiliated from the literature, we developed a bipartite central probability model comparing a
deregulated market without patents to a market using the patent system. The main objectives
were to evaluate the frequency of innovations in the software market and on the other hand to
investigate monopolistic tendencies. We simulated our model under two different parameter
constellations (optimistic and pessimistic environment from a patent owner’s view). Selected
snapshots of exemplary simulations showed that strong patent protection circumvented tech-
nical progress from a macroeconomic perspective. Moreover, in the long run only one actor
(monopolist) dominated the market. Reducing the protection strength (pessimistic environ-
ment) resulted in partially contrary effects.
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1. Introduction
Software patents are a topic currently being discussed in Europe and Germany. According to
article 52 of the European Patent Agreement of 1973, computer programs are not inventions
and therefore not subject to European patent law. But in a strict sense this is only valid for
“software as such”. Accordingly, European adjudication grants patents for software. This is
more comparable to the practice found in the United States, where not only software but also
business methods are patentable. Wolfgang Tauchert from the German Patent- and Trade-
mark-office estimated the number of granted patents involving software in 2001 to be over
500. In this context the term “computer implemented inventions” is used (DPMA 2002).
In the attempt to narrow this discrepancy between law and adjudication, the European com-
mission conducted a pan-European questioning of the software industry. As a consequence
the European commission proposes to overtake the US approach, except the patenting of
business methods. Addressing this problem, we developed a two-stage model comparing
economic efficiency of systems with and without patents. The purpose of this paper is to an-
swer the following two questions:
1) In which scenario (patents vs. no patents) can we expect a higher level of innova-
tion in any given time scope? In other words: which scenario exhibits stronger in-
centives to innovate?
2) How do the scenarios differ in terms of the endemic propensity to monopolize?
After an overview of software patents in the economic literature (section 2) the software
market is analyzed (section 3). Based on this, in section 4 an economic simulation model in-
corporating local incentives associated with patents and their implications on system behav-
ior is developed. Section 5 shows first simulation results.
2. Literature Review
Various approaches in the economic literature analyze the correlation between patents, inno-
vation, and social welfare. Software patents in particular are often discussed in a controver-
sial context. We differentiate in four viewpoints:
· Software patents and the incentive problem
· Patent race and cross licensing
· Network effects and standards
· Special features of software
Software Patents and the Incentive Problem
The standard economic rationale for patents is to protect potential innovators from imitation,
thereby providing the incentive to incur the cost of innovation. The innovator receives a tem-
porary monopolistic position (Besen & Raskind 1991). The usage of the patent system in this
point has two essential advantages:
· The patent owner (monopolist) is able to claim higher prices and larger market shares.
· The time frame for skimming the market will be extended artificially.
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In the future, the patent owner has the possibility of offering licenses and the chance to par-
ticipate in the development or improvement of future innovations created by other innovators
(Ordover 1991). Because the patenting process is expensive (one application in Europe can
cost up to € 30.000 (Beckmann 2002), small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) in par-
ticular are disadvantaged. As a consequence, scarce financial and know-how resources estab-
lish substantial barriers to patenting among SMEs. An optimal company strategy could be
nondisclosure (Friedewald, Blind and Edler, 2002).
Nordhaus et al. focus on the problem resulting when technological improvements are used by
a very small group of users. From an economic perspective due to their high costs, patents are
a suboptimal solution compared to the scenario without patents (Nordhaus 1969; Gilbert &
Shapiro 1990; Klemperer 1990).
Jaffe suggests that patents inhibit other innovation activities, e.g. in such a matter, that the
access to licenses needed for improvements will be denied. This is characterized as negative
after deductions-effect (Jaffe 1999). Kortum and Lerner furthermore point out that despite
decreasing R&D expenditure, the number of patents in the US is increasing quickly. They
substantiate these correlations with company-wide advanced innovation management (Kor-
tum & Lerner 1997). The same perception is represented by Bessen and Maskin. Moreover
they discuss about trivial patents which conduct knowledge that is counted among the state
of the art, and therefore not patentable (Bessen & Maskin 2000).
2.1 Patent Race and Cross Licensing
As shown previously, the process of patent application is very cost intensive. Because each
patent can only be assigned once, innovators often find themselves in a patent race. Only one
can be the winner of this race. Although the losers of the race have the same R&D and patent
application costs, they attain no revenue. In this context Dasgupta and Stieglitz speak of a
socially unwanted situation and missing commensurability (Dasgupta & Stieglitz 1980). On
the other hand the licensing process offers a possibility for reducing the future innovation
costs of other innovators (Loury 1979; Ordover 1991). The winner normally is not engaged
in offering licenses. Licensing implies competition and endangers the patent owner’s monop-
oly position. This leads to the inhibition of R&D by other inventors with concepts for im-
provements on a patented product (Bessen & Maskin 2000).
If, for example, another actor has invested in developing an improvement to a product, the
firm holding the original patent may use its monopoly position to appropriate some of the
value created by the complementary innovation. This can occur even if a second firm obtains
a patent on the improvement. If the second firm can market its innovation with the consent of
the first firm, the first firm can increase its profits at the expense of the second by bargaining
to license the complementary technology at less than full value. This holdup problem reduces
R&D in complementary technologies through inventors reducing the expected return on their
investment (Chang 1995).
Although it appears as though licenses will never be assigned in such situations, it still hap-
pens. Nowadays patents possess the function of currencies. If a company needs another firms
license for its own activities, it tries to exchange its own license with that of the other license
holder. This operation is referred to as cross licensing. Patents are used as weapon in compe-
tition and play a decisive role second to negotiations (Harhoff & Reitzig 2000).
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2.2 Network Effects and Standards
The software market is determined by positive network effects deriving from the need of
product compatibility (Ceci & Kain 1982). The willingness to adopt a product innovation
correlates positively with the number of existing adopters (Weitzel, Wendt and von Westarp
1999).
Markets with network effects finally will lock-in to a monopoly situation with one standard
winning total market share. In some respects standards make further innovations and diver-
sity difficult (Farrell & Saloner 1986). On the other hand, standards provide for compatibility
and are a prerequisite for cooperation benefits. An essential assumption for collaboration
benefits are open interfaces so that interoperability between different systems and applica-
tions can be realized. Many SMEs would have no access to large customer networks without
this interoperability. They normally are not able to establish company-standard-based net-
works (Blind, Edler, Nack and Straus 2001). The absence of open interfaces may lead to a
lock-in of existing customers, and therefore to monopoly network structures, because the
changing costs are to high for the current participants (Farrell 1989). Patented interfaces
boost this problem.
Stolpe claims the necessity of installing strong property rights, particulary in markets with
network effects, because they enable innovators to internalize positive externalities, and to
achieve a high market penetration without product piracy and imitation (Stolpe 2000).
2.3 Special Features of Software
Software development is basically distinguished from other products by five characteristics
which are decisive for the question of patenting and its consequences:
a) Sequentiality and Complementarity
Sequential means that each successive invention is built on the preceding one. The rate of re-
using code is very high (Bessen & Maskin 2000; Besen & Raskind 1991). Complementary
means that each potential innovator takes a somehow different research line, thereby en-
hancing the overall probability that a particular innovation goal will be reached within a
given time scope (Bessen & Maskin 2000). The sequential and complementary nature of in-
novations is widely recognized, especially in high tech industries (Gort & Klepper 1992;
Green & Scotchmer 1995; Chang 1995). Analyses of many innovations found that most of
the productivity gains are achieved via improvements to the original innovation (e.g. (Enos
1962)). A variety of empirical studies found strong evidence of innovative complementarities
(Spence 1984; Jaffe 1986; Grilichs 1992). Figure 1 shows the re-use of code in the German
software industry, split in primary (IT-Service providers and manufacturers of data process-
ing equipment) and secondary industry (manufacturing systems engineering, electrical engi-
neering, vehicle construction, telecommunication and financial services):
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Figure 1: Re-use of code (Blind et al. 2001)
b) Utilization and Availability of Open Code
Open code is one of the most important external factors for software development. The
strongest usage emanates from independent developers, but recently the re-use of open source
software by medium-size and large companies has increased as well (Friedewald et al. 2002).
Open Source has generic character, i.e. in many cases it is functional input which makes
software development more effective. There is no significant argument for utilizing Open
Source, but a relatively well balanced set of motives (e.g. adaptability, state-of-the-art, costs
and quality). Disclosure of code is used mostly as strategy to diffuse information about one’s
own performance.
c) Interoperability
Attributes of software that bear on the ability to interact with specified systems and with
other software products are defined as interoperability (ISO 1991). The European computer
law directive describes interoperability as the capability of a computer program to exchange
information (Fromm & Nordemann 1998). Interoperability with customer and supplier soft-
ware and with competitive and complementary products can be achieved by disclosure of in-
terfaces; the disclosure of code plays a subordinate role here. For example, patents on proto-
cols required for interoperability are a barrier when trying to implement compatible solutions.
d) Digital Goods Character
Emery has studied the character of software, such as fast diffusion and diversification. He
found evidence that, due to the high diffusion of information technologies, software develop-
ers (innovators) compared to imitators are at a disadvantage, because copying and imitating
becomes easier. For this reason he favors software patents (Emery 1996).
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2.4 Summary of Positive and Negative Aspects
The following table summarizes positive and negative aspects of patenting software. We dis-
tinguished between the view of an individual actor (microeconomic perspective) and a mac-
roeconomic perspective.
Positive aspects Negative aspects
Microeconomic perspective
Discourage of imitators through the conse-
quences of infringement.
Patents also hamper piracy.
An extended time frame for skimming the
market is given.
Substantial costs:
costs of patent description and of patent
agents,
patent application and the costs of assignation
of patents,
costs of the extension of a patent.
Patents enforce the first mover advantage and
therefore the de-facto-standardization (posi-
tive feedback loops).
Patent infringement is difficult to control, es-
pecially in embedded systems. Moreover dis-
covery of infringement is very expensive.
Patents represent assets strengthening the
relative competitive position.
The liability of disclosure (6 months) opens
the ideas for others and gives them the chance
to market the ideas earlier.
The liability of disclosure (6 months) opens
the ideas of others for own developments.
Development costs increase, because of li-
censes or bypass of patented developments.
Improvements are only possible on a com-
plementary way (low rate of code re-using).
Risk of market exclusion.
Expending of development costs through the
chance of being the monopolist and claiming
higher prices.
Patents can hamper interoperability.
Licensing and cross licensing are possible.
Macroeconomic perspective
Patents are an important incentive for spend-
ing money in R&D.
Decrease of development efforts (holdup
problem), cannibalize the own network.
Decrease of variety of products.
Inhibition of R&D by others through the de-
nial of licenses.
Table 1: Positive and negative aspects of patents
3. Topological structure of the German software market
In 2001 the revenue of the German market for software and IT services (primary and secon-
dary industry) increased by about 12% to € 34 billion (EITO 2001). Altogether both indus-
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tries consist of 19.300 companies producing software (10.568 in primary branch and 8,990 in
secondary branch) (GfKM 2000).
Employees Companies producing soft-
ware (primary industry)
Companies producing software
(secondary industry)
With 1-9 employees 173.8 058.4
With 10-49 employees 735.1 242.2
With 50-199 employees 475 326.1
With >199 employees 185 364.1
Total 10.568 8.990
Table 2: Structure of the German software market
The German Information and Communication Technology market (ICT market) has been
impacted heavily by the economic slowdown, even if the various markets have been affected
in a different level, stronger in the hardware segments, and fewer in software and services
(Bitkom 2002). The subsequent data refers to the primary and secondary branch.
German software market value, billion €
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Software products 12.6 14.4 15.2 15.1 15.1
Expansion rate  14.2% 5.4% -0.80% -0.30%
Table 3: German software market
The total effort for Research and Development averages € 1.359 million in the primary
branch (GfKM 2000). Therefore on average a company in the primary branch expends €
129.000 for R&D. 1
4. Software Market and Patents - Simulation Model
4.1 Assumptions
The following assumptions are based on the preceding literature review and the analysis of
the software market:
1. The software market is characterized by short innovation cycles. Improvements
emerge frequently in a cycle of less than 12 months.
                                                
1 €000.129
568.10
€359.1
=
companies
million
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Figure 2: Innovation cycles (Blind et al. 2001)
2. The software market is characterized by a high rate of incremental progress. Innova-
tions in this market are profoundly sequential.
3. The market is characterized by a high degree of complementarity.
4. Research and Development efforts in one generation become obsolete after a few pe-
riods.
5. The structure of the German software market is characterized by a large number of
SMEs.
6. The software market is characterized by strong network effects.
7. R&D-efforts have an extensive impact on finding future innovations.
4.2 Model Structure
Based on these assumptions, we created a bipartite economic probability model comparing a
deregulated market without patents to a market using the patent system.
Structural Parameters
The model encompasses I actors, representing software manufacturers in a special segment of
the software market (e.g. text processing). Therefore they compete against each other for the
same innovation in a period. The model considers three different company sizes. Based on
the topological data of the German software market the actors are determined as small (80%),
medium-size (15%) and large companies (5%).
The planning horizon of the model is T. Based on assumption 1 and 2, we assume, that all
actors have to decide for investment in development in every period anew and then are able
to find the innovation.
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Figure 3: Development timeline
Monetary Parameters
In each generation one or several parallel innovations lead to the economic profit tv  which is
assumed to be constant over time and will be split to the successful actors (analogous to the
model of Bessen & Maskin (2000)).
Ttv
I
i
itt ..1
1
="== å
=
nn
Equation 1: Economic profit
Another parameter influencing the expected profit are the development costs ditc  in every pe-
riod. The greater the efforts the smaller the profits, but, the higher the probability of success,
as will be shown later. The amount of ditc depends on the company’s size.
If patenting is possible the companies taking part in the patenting process have to spend pat-
ent process costs pitc  which include:
· costs of patent description and of patent agents,
· patent application and the costs of assignation of patents,
· costs of the extension of a patent.
The second and third item which only have to be paid by the winner, are of marginal weight.
Probability Parameters
The determination of the actor’s probability pit for finding the innovation in period t forms
the core of the presented model. pit is functionally dependent of the following parameters:
· Development costs, spent in t and in the former 3 periods: dit
d
it
d
it
d
it cccc 321 ,,, --- .
· Innovation success in the preceding 3 periods, represented by the binary variables xit-1, xit-2,
xit-3. xit is equal to one, if actor i found the innovation in period t.
· Existence of patents: if patenting without licensing is possible, incremental improvements
of others in future periods have to be found in a complementary way, what diminishes
their chances for success (assumption 3). This effect is represented by eit which decreases
the probability, if the innovation in period t was patented by an actor j¹i.
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Equation 2: Influence of existing patents
The binary variable zit reflects the successful patenting process for actor i’s innovation in
period t. Existence of patent protection in Europe persists for 20 years and therefore influ-
ences the others innovation probability for 20 periods.
The degree of impact of the included historical parameters decreases with a growing time
gap. This effect will be realized by using reverse discounting factors wd and wx (0< wd < wx <
1) for diminishing the respective historical parameters dit
d
it
d
it
d
it cccc 321 ,,, --- , and xit-1, xit-2, xit-3.
Stronger impact of later patents will be realized by exponentiating e.
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Equation 3: Factors of innovation probabilities
Terms A and B have to be normalized to values below one. Therefore the respective maximal
parameter values have to be determined by inserting the upper limits of the included pa-
rameters. dct  is the upper bound of large companies’ development costs:
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Equation 4: Normalization of innovation probability factors
Within the probability function the normalized components are weighted again, to adjust the
relative strength of the factors´ impact. At least, the whole construct is divided by M, which
represents the overall difficulty to find innovations in the particular market.
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Equation 5: Innovation probability
Because the necessary values do not exist in the early periods the following conventions are
made:
11,0,0 <"=== txc iit
d
it te
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Equation 6: Conventions for parameter values in t<1
Decision Process
The innovation and patenting process consists of four activity steps in each period.
 I. Actor i has to decide whether or not to participate in the innovation process, i.e. spend-
ing development costs ditc .
 II. The research process turns out to be either successful (xit=1) or unsuccessful (xit=0), ac-
cording to the innovation success probability pit.
 III. If xit=1, the actor has to decide about taking part in the patent race ¾®¾then  (yit=1).
 IV. Only one actor can win the patent race. The winner is determined by a random genera-
tor with equal probability for every actor, taking part in the patent race. If i is the win-
ner, then zit=1, otherwise zit=0.
(Steps III and IV only occur, if the model is equipped with a legal patent protection system.)
A risk-neutral actor I in period t will only invest in R&D if its expected net benefit E(nit) is
positive. The expectation depends on the individual innovation probability, on the elevation
of effort, and on the network size. The bigger the network, the more actors will find the inno-
vation resulting in a reduced part of the economic profit. uit represents the resulting decision.
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Equation 7: Decision function for investing in R&D (step I)
As an estimator for 
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ë
é
å
=
I
i
itxE
1
 the number of actors who found the innovation in the period
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Equation 8: Decision function for investing in R&D (appendix)
The expected value does not include resulting future benefits, because the complexity of the
model increases in oversized wise, furthermore the technological progress is not predictable
in the software market.
If the actors can take advantage of an installed patent protection mechanism, the model im-
plements an additional decision function for evaluating the benefits of patenting, including
the probability to win the patenting race. Therefore a binary variable yit is equal to one if ac-
tor i wishes to patent his innovation. Every innovator agrees to the patenting process if the
economic profit exceeds the sum of all innovations multiplied with cp.
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The future utility of patenting in present was not taken into account. This extension will be
made in future work.
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Equation 9: Decision for patenting (step II)
The decision process can be described as a game theoretical problem with I players. With two
players the following situation is given:
Agent = 1
S21=(y2=1) S22=(y2=1)
S11=(y2=1)
ptpt c
v
;c
v --
22
0;cv pt -
Agent = 2
S12=(y2=0) p
t cv; -0
22
tt v;v
Table 4: Two person game
If å>
I
i
it
p
t xcv , s11/s21 becomes the only Nash-equilibrium and the Pareto-optimum will not
occur. Therefore the actors are in a prisoner’s dilemma.
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Figure 4: Activity diagram
From a macroeconomic view, the main aim is to find as much as possible generations with
innovations.
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Equation 10: Macroeconomic objective
The two key questions are:
1) In which scenario (patents vs. no patents) can we expect a higher level of innova-
tion in any given time scope? In other words: Which of these scenarios exhibits
stronger incentives to innovate?
The first part of question, the number of innovations over the time, will be addressed by
equation 10. For ascertaining the second part the average of the expectation values of all par-
ticipants in one period equation 7 is taken.
2) How do the two scenarios differ in terms of the endemic propensity to monopolize?
The number of innovations will be condensed into the Herfindahl-index used in industrial
economics to measure market concentration. The index is calculated by summing up the
squared market shares of each innovator.2
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Equation 11: Herfindahl-index
5. Exemplary Model Computation
5.1 Parameters Constellations
In order to obtain data about the two research questions, we computed a small instance of the
model. A distinction into two different environments was made:
1. optimistic environment with small e,
2. pessimistic environment with e closely to one.
Every environment was computed with 20 actors of different sizes in a ratio analogous to the
real German market structure. The simulation was run for 50 periods. The cost parameters
were equally distributed within the following ranges, while the total economic profit was
fixed to vt=100 in every period:
Actor’s size: large medium small
d
ic upper border 5 3 1
d
ic lower border 2 0.5 0
Table 5: Monetary parameters
                                                
2 If only one innovator finds an innovation in a period the concentration index takes the maximal value of 1, while it becomes minimal (con-
centration index of 1/I) if every actor finds the innovation.
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The costs for the patent process cp are negligible in such a small scenario, because even if
they are as unrealistically high as the maximal development costs of large companies and
each company would find the innovation, each of them would try to get the patent. cp comes
into account, when more realistic market sizes will be simulated.
The probability parameters are equal in the different constellations (except e) and constant in
time. The probability parameters are:
Constant Probability Parameters
Reducant by patent protection e 0.85; 0,.999
Weight of prior development costs wd 0.9
Weight of prior successful innovations wx 0.9
Relative weight of development costs a 0.5
Relative weight of successful innovations b 0.5
Market difficulty M 1.0
Table 6: Probability parameters
5.2 Results
Optimistic Environment (e=0.85)
In all of the following diagrams the differing results of both scenarios - with and without pat-
enting possibility - are shown.
Figure 5: Sum of innovation activities
Figure 5 shows how many actors spent development costs in the several periods. In the first
two periods all actors took efforts. In the first period nobody found an innovation, but in the
second generation four actors found it. In this case all actors took part in the patent race
which finally was won by actor 12. The impact of this patent on the innovation activities of
the remaining actors was so enormous, that in future generations nobody else spent develop-
ment costs. Without patents noticeably more actors invested in development activities.
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Figure 6: Average of expectation
An interesting result is that after a few generations with increasing innovation rates the ave r-
age expectation decreases. This happens because of the estimator for
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Figure 7: Found innovations
To evaluate our first question we simply counted all periods with innovations. In every snap-
shot under this constellation the scenario without patents had a significant higher rate of in-
novations.
Macroeconomic results With patents Without patents
Sum of periods with innovation 39 48
Table 7: Innovations with and without patents
To get an overview of the incentive situation in both “worlds” we calculated the average ex-
pectation of the actor’s decision function (equation 7) over all actors. In figure 6 it can be
seen that the average expectation was always higher in the scenario without patents.
The second main question was answered by the calculation of the Herfindahl-index. The en-
demic propensity to monopolize for the scenario with patents was confirmed. One actor won
the patent race in period 1, after which he was the only innovator in all periods. The missing
points represent periods in which he didn’t find the innovation. In the environment with pat-
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ent system we measured an inter-temporal Herfindahl–coefficient HFI, which represents the
distribution of the several monopolies in time on the different actors. In this case was HFI=1,
which means, that every monopoly was held by the same innovator.
Pessimistic Environment (e=0.999)
In this environment both scenarios show almost similar results. The two peaks in periods 28
and 31 (figure 8) result from a an optimistic estimator in these periods. This is because in pe-
riod 27 only one and in period 30 only three actors found an innovation (see figure 10). This
relation can also be seen in figure 9, where the average expectations are rather high in periods
28 and 31.
Figure 8: Sum of innovation activities
Figure 9: Average of expectation
Most innovations were found in period 6 with 13 resp. 12 innovations. The oscillations in this
figure result from the nature of the probability function.
N. Hoppen, D. Beimborn, W. König                                                                        The Impact of Software Patents
Figure 10: Found innovations
It is remarkable that if the protection strength of the patent is rather small (e nearly 1), mar-
ginally more innovations will be found.
Macroeconomic results With patents Without patents
Sum of periods with innovation 49 48
Table 8: Innovation with and without patents
The Herfindahl-coefficient is one in every period, which means that like before, anytime the
innovators competed for a patent because of the small market size. Contrary to the optimistic
environment the inter-temporal Herfindahl-index was only 0.1112, denoting, that the patent
winner changed often over time.
Figure 11: Herfindahl-index
6. Conclusion and Further Research
In this paper the impact of software patents on innovation success of software developers was
analyzed with a bipartite model for comparing environments with and without a legal patent
system. Software development could be basically characterized by five characteristics deci-
sive for the question of patenting and its consequences: Sequentiality, complementarity, utili-
zation availability of open code, the necessity to ensure interoperability, as well as  the digi-
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tal goods character. Based on these assumptions the model encompasses the factors influ-
encing innovation success. We identified two key factors, taking effect upon the next three
periods, the development costs and the existence of previous innovations. In the patent sce-
nario the patent itself will have an additional effect. From the patent owner’s perspective, we
distinguished between two different environments, namely optimistic and pessimistic. Opti-
mistic means that the impact of patent protection is very high, i.e. that the other actors not
being the patent owner have smaller innovation probabilities in future generations (e£0.9). In
the pessimistic environment e is nearly one. Selected snapshots of exemplary simulations of
small model instances showed that strong patent protection circumvented technical progress
from a macroeconomic perspective. Moreover, in the long run only one actor (monopolist)
dominated the market. Reducing the protection strength (pessimistic environment) resulted in
partially contrary effects.
In our next steps we have to test the parameterization by simulating bigger instances of the
model, integrating sensitivity analyses, and by reflecting the results against empirical obser-
vations. The actors’ development costs values could be endorsed, to get more valuable find-
ings about the incentive level of the members of the software industry. Further incentive po-
tentials of patents have to be evaluated and to be integrated into the model and into the game
theoretical examinations, which at least have to be augmented with a nondeterministic infor-
mation base. Based on this, the model could be used as framework to make normative state-
ments, determining the necessity of a patent system or evaluating the optimal length of patent
protection subject to the particular cost structures of the software market.
7. References
Beckmann, J. (2002). Merkblatt Auslandspatente, http://www.be-patent.de/MBpatwo.PDF,
downloaded on 02/10/03)
Besen, S.M. and L. J. Raskind (1991). An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Intel-
lectual Property. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5 (1), 3-27.
Bessen, J. and E. Maskin (2000). Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation. MIT Work-
ing Paper 11/99, Cambridge.
Bitkom 2002, ITK-Marktzahlen: ITK-Marktzahlen.pdf. http://www.bitkom.org, (downloaded
on 01/27/02).
Blind, K.; Edler, J.; Nack, R. and Straus, J. (2001). Mikro- und makroökonomische
Implikationen der Patentierbarkeit von Softwareinnovationen: Geistige Eigentumsrechte
in der Informationstechnologie im Spannungsfeld von Wettbewerb und Innovation,
research report, BmWT(36/00).
Ceci, S.J. and E.L. Kain (1982). Jumping on the bandwagon: The impact of attitude polls on
polling behavior. Public Opinion Quarterly, 46, 228-242.
Chang, H. (1995). Patent scope, antitrust policy and cumulative innovation. RAND Journal
of Economics, 26 (1), 34-57.
Dasgupta, P. and J.E. Stiglitz (1980). Industrial Structure and the Nature of Innovative Ac-
tivity. Economic Journal, 90 (358), 266-293.
Emery, S. (1996). Innovation and Intellectual Property Protection: The Software Industry
Perspective. The Columbia Journal of World Business, 31 (1), 30-37.
EITO (2001). European Information Technology Observatory 2001, Frankfurt/Main.
N. Hoppen, D. Beimborn, W. König                                                                        The Impact of Software Patents
Enos, J. (1962). Petroleum Progress and Profits: a history of process innovation. MIT Press,
Cambridge.
Farrell, J. (1989). Standardization and Intellectual Property. Jurimetrics Journal 1989, 35-50.
Farrell, J. and G. Saloner (1986). Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation, Product Pre-
announcements, and Predation. The American Economic Review, 76 (5), 940-955.
Friedewald, M., Blind, K. and Edler, J (2002). Die Innovationstätigkeit der deutschen
Softwareindustrie. Wirtschaftsinfo rmatik, 44 (2), 151-161.
Fromm, W. and K. Nordemann (1998). Urheberrecht, Comment. 9th. Edition, W.
Kohlhammer, Stut tgart.
GfK Marktforschung GmbH/Fraunhofer-Institut (2000). Analyse und Evaluation der
Softwareentwicklung in Deutschland, 12/2000.
Gilbert, R. and C. Shapiro (1990). Optimal Patent Length and Breadth. RAND Journal of
Economics, 21 (1), 106-112.
Gort, M. and D. Klepper (1992). Time paths in the diffusion of product innovations. The
Economic Journal, 92 (367), 630-653.
Green, J. and S. Scotchmer (1995). On the Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation.
RAND Journal of Economics, 25 (1), 20-33.
Grilichs, Z. (1992). The Search for R&D Spillovers. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 94,
supplement, 29-47.
Harhoff, D. and M. Reitzig (2000). Strategien zur Gewinnmaximierung bei der Anmeldung
von Patenten. Working paper, Munich.
ISO (1991). ISO 9126: 1991, A.2.1.3.
Jaffe, A.B. (1986). Technological opportunity and spillovers of R&D: Evidence from firms'
patents, profits and market value. American Economic Review, 76 (5), 984-993.
Jaffe, A.B. (1999). The U.S. Patent System in Transition: Policy Innovation and the Innova-
tion Process. National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 7280, Cambridge.
Klemperer, P. (1990). How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be? RAND Journal
of Economics, 21 (1), 113-130.
Kortum, S. and J. Lerner (1997). Stronger Protection or Technological Revolution: What is
behind the Recent Surge in Patenting. National Bureau of Economic Research, Working
Paper 6204, Cambridge.
Loury, G.C. (1979). Market Structure and Innovation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 93
(3), 395-410.
Lutterbeck, B. (2000). Sicherheit in der Informationstechnologie und Patentschutz für
Software-Produkte – Ein Widerspruch? Working paper 056, http://www.sicherheit-im-
internet.de/news/news.phtml?nnid=588, (downloaded on 11/05/02).
Nordhaus, W.D. (1969). Invention, Growth, and Welfare, A Theoretical Treatment of Tech-
nological Change. MIT Press, Cambridge.
Ordover, J.A. (1991). A Patent System for Both Diffusion and Exclusion. Journal of Eco-
nomic Perspectives, 5 (1), 43-60.
N. Hoppen, D. Beimborn, W. König                                                                        The Impact of Software Patents
Spence, M. (1984). Cost reduction, competition, and industry performance. Econometrica, 52
(1), 101-122.
Stolpe, M. (2000). Protection against Software Piracy: A Study of Technology Adoption for
the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights. Economics of Innovation and New Tech-
nology, 7 (1), 25-52.
DPMA (2002). Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt, http://www.dpma.de/infos/pressedienst/-
pm020312a.html, (downloaded on 15/07/02).
Weitzel, T., Wendt, O. and von Westarp, F. (1999). Reconsidering Network Effect Theory.
Proceedings of the 8th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS 2000), 484-
491, Wien.
